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Abstract 
This paper examines the inter-generational financial dimensions and accounting 
implications of under-funding practices in the public sector. We explain why inter-
generational financial disclosure has become such an urgent issue internationally, and 
discuss a generational accounting framework for calculating the necessary financial 
information to reveal the inequities and resource allocation problems afflicting public 
sector organizations.  The main limitations, assumptions and applications of a 
generational approach to analyse the financial sustainability of public sector enterprises 
are briefly discussed. 
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Introduction 
The public sector commands a substantial proportion of any nation’s total capital investment. 
However, unlike privately funded organizations, public sector organizations are typically under-
funded in the sense that the government fails to pay the necessary contributions as they fall due. 
Moreover, the increasing importance of government and other public sector entities in providing 
either explicit or implicit insurance guarantees for pensions, social security and health care 
programs, which involve inter-temporal investment and consumption commitments, has 
significantly reduced the relevance and reliability of traditional financial statements, that are 
based on accrual-based accounting. This is because, under accrual-based accounting principles, 
the recognition and payment of their obligations related to various social programs and welfare 
services is effectively deferred until the relevant entitlement must be paid, which has important 
implications for general taxpayers who ultimately bear the cost of employer contributions 
towards government insurance programs. Thus, the liability created by population ageing and the 
associated under-funding shifts responsibility for payment away from the present generation of 
taxpayers onto future generations who must make up the funding shortfall as the benefits actually 
fall due. This effectively forces future generations of contributors or taxpayers to bear the burden 
of funding the retirement benefits of previous generations of beneficiaries. Under-funded 
government liabilities for public sector obligations constitutes a major expenditure in the 
management of social programs in many countries, but to date has not attracted much attention 
from accountants as it does not easily fit within an accrual-based accounting system, despite the 
recession causing many governments to further postpone their future obligations. Existing or 
proposed international standards continue to assume that obligations are only accountable if the 
service has already been provided and/or that the amount measured is limited to a ‘curtailment’ 
valuation. However, these standards, while applicable to private sector, may not apply to the 
public sector where governments are expected to make a continuing and ongoing commitment for 
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the future welfare and provision of health care, social security, pensions and other insurance-
related commitments. The OECD has recently issued calls for greater disclosure of liabilities and 
contingent obligations (OECD, 2004, IMF 2009). 
 
Given that behavioral persistence of under-funding practices of most insurance-related guarantee 
programs is typical of many OECD countries, a major unresolved accounting issue is their 
generational implications for affected stakeholders. However it is not at all clear that this form 
of inter-generational equity is a concern of governments. Under the Westminster Principle of 
government, governments are only accountable for, and elected on, the basis of policies during 
the elected term of their office. These principles can in turn induce governments of cash-
strapped economies to take myopic views. For instance, the UK government recently 
consolidated the assets of a publicly unfunded pension scheme (Royal Mail), but argued that it 
was not required to be accountable for the obligations (e.g. Financial Times, 9 May 2009). 
Moreover, prior researchers have only tended to focus on the accrual accounting aspects of 
public sector under-funding practices. For example, Marks et al. (1988), Mitchell and Smith 
(1994) and Chaney et al. (1997) examine the determinants of pension funding in the US public 
sector by reference to short-term, legalistic measures of the obligations and assets.  
 
However, while concluding that past under-funding practices are likely to continue in the future, 
prior USA-based researchers have not examined their inter-generational equity implications. 
This is because relevant US GAAP, as promulgated by the Government Accounting Standards 
Board (‘GASB’) requires, in accordance with accrual-based accounting principles, USA 
government insurance programs to recognise the periodic difference between the market value of 
pension fund assets and the under-funded element of the equivalent pension fund obligation 
(GASB, 1994, Para 22). However, recently the Federal Advisory Standards Accounting Board 
proposed amending this to allow for recognition at the point where the benefit is acquired rather 
than at the point where it is payable (FASAB, 2006). This is consistent with a lifecycle approach 
to investment and finance (Bodie, 2006). Only the US federal government has proposed the 
introduction of a ‘Statement of Social Insurance for Social Security’, which effective in 2007, 
will show forecast information for the present value of future benefit payments and future 
contributions, and the net actuarial imbalance in 75 years (FASAB, 2006, IPSAS 2005). 
However, the information does not extend to recognizing the ‘inter-generational liability’, nor 
does it articulate with the overall reported funding position of the US federal government. In 
addition, governments provide financial guarantees or insurance policies that oblige the 
government to make promised payments on a financial contract if the issuer fails to do so (Bodie 
and Merton, 1992). An example of such a guarantee is the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation. These guarantees are potentially valuable for the third party, and moral hazard 
behavior for under-funded pension obligations can lead to significant exposure by the 
government that is not currently recognised. 
 
This paper proposes a generational accounting framework that is consistent with a life cycle 
perspective on the financial management of under-funded public sector liabilities. Generational 
accounting was motivated by the claim that the measured public deficit need bear no 
relationship to the underlying inter-generational stance of fiscal policy, and the tendency of 
governments to use short-term budget deficits as an instrument for long-term planning by 
excluding social security from the deficit (Kotlikoff, 1986, 1992, 1993). Auerbach, Gokhale and 
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Kotlikoff (1991) developed generational accounting, which is a method for estimating the 
economic impact of fiscal policy on different cohorts – including future ones – as distinguished 
by birth year and gender (Gokhale, 2009). However as generational accounting is also based on 
a prospective per capita life time net tax burden faced by different cohorts, it also presents a 
number of challenges for implementation in financial management contexts. This article first 
discusses the background, then summarises the major features of generational accounting, its 
applications, and identifies its limiting assumptions and potential applications, and finally 
discusses its policy implications. 
The Institutional Context 
In many countries, unlike the private sector, public sector insurance-related program activities 
are typically under-funded since the relevant program may either be totally unfunded or involve 
specified assets that at any particular time may not cover the equivalent liabilities for which the 
fund is responsible  
 
The under-funding generally arises in two ways (Mitchell and Smith, 1994). One method is to 
adopt unrealistic assumptions that reduce legally required contributions. For example the spread 
between the assumed rate of return on investments and the rate of assumed wage growth 
determines, in effect, the real discount rate applied to future liabilities. The other major form of 
under-funding arises because governments do not pay their contributions into the fund as they 
fall due. This practice, consistent with the behavioral persistence hypothesis, effectively shifts 
the burden for payment of present generations of workers onto future generations of taxpayers, 
who meet the shortfall because the government effectively pays benefits out of their (annual) 
contributions to the general revenue fund, including the net effect.  
 
The continuation of this fiscal policy makes it doubtful whether future tax revenues will be 
sufficient to secure their obligations in many OECD countries (World Bank, 1994; Roseveare et 
al., 1996). Ageing populations in many countries (including Australia) imply an unreported tax 
burden on future generations. This is because, contrary to government accounting conventions, 
they must bear the burden of funding their own pension benefits as well as paying off 
accumulated deficits for the benefits of previous (and larger) generations of workers. 
 
The non-payment or under-payment of contributions by governments result in various insurance-
related programs totally unfunded, and thus represents a major form of public borrowing against 
the future. Continuation of past practices in government fiscal policy of under-funding public 
sector pensions may adversely affect future revenue-raising potentials of governments. It also 
puts at risk the income security of public sector retirees, which is critically affected by under-
funding policies. Further, since the public sector workforce is maturing along with the rest of the 
population, these under-funding practices take on increasing importance as time passes (Mitchell 
and Smith, 1994). These practices have significant inter-generational financial consequences for 
at least three groups of stakeholders – present and future taxpayers, beneficiaries, and 
government policy makers. Thus, the demand for evaluating inter-generational effects of 
government policies is very important. However, although now used extensively by macro-
economic policy makers, the application of these concepts to financial reporting by government 
and public sector entities has been largely overlooked.  
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At the whole of government or public sector reporting entity level, there is still a lack of financial 
disclosure in government financial reports that will allow users to make judgments about (i) the 
extent of aggregate under-funding, (ii) the implicit taxation burden placed on future generations 
and (iii) implications for inter-generational equity issues, despite OECD recommendations 
(Kotlikoff and Burns, 2004). Current deficit/surplus type government reporting conveys little 
information about the generational taxation consequences that arise from under-funding practices 
(Kotlikoff, 1993). The deficiency persists at whole of government financial reporting levels, 
despite the replacement of cash based accounting with accrual accounting conventions as the 
preferred model for government accounting in Australia. The accrual measures used in current 
reporting requirements continue to reflect a ‘stock’ view of the world at a point in time, rather 
than a ‘flow of required obligations’ perspective (Auerbach et al., 1991, 1992; Mitchell and 
Smith, 1994).  
   
There are also limitations associated with relying on a single ‘stock’ funding ratio to assess the 
financial condition of government insurance programs. First, under-funding policy is dynamic 
and cannot be described by a short-term measure that entirely ignores its likely future 
consequences. Second, a single measure cannot identify the inter-generational distribution of the 
burden of fiscal pressure at any given time (Auerbach et al., 1994). Without dealing with these 
issues it is impossible to identify how the burden of fiscal pressure is distributed across 
generations, information often demanded by users of government financial reporting (e.g.: 
Henke, 1987; DioGuardi, 1995). Indeed, Copley et al. (1997) conclude that there is little reason 
to expect accrual-based accounting reforms to increase the citizen use of government financial 
reports.  
 
The need for supplementary disclosure to reveal inter-generational aspects of government 
financial management policies is gaining recognition with public sector accounting standard 
setters. According to the GASB’s Statement of Objectives of Government Financial Reporting 
(GASB, 1987, Para 2), financial statements need to report on inter-period equity as a key element 
in demonstrating accountability in the government context. This view implies that public under-
funding is undesirable and perceives financial reporting as a monitoring mechanism in promoting 
inter-period equity (Marks et al., 1988).  
 
Under deficit/surplus accounting, governments sum up current period total dollar outlays and 
revenues of all kinds and express the difference between these as a ‘deficit’ or ‘surplus’. This 
form of accounting has resulted in public employee pension system borrowing being kept ‘off 
the books’ at the whole of government level (Mitchell and Smith, 1994).  
Financial and Generational Stability 
This section overviews the basic concepts related to financial and generational sensitivity of 
unfunded government programs related to social security, pensions and health care obligations. 
We first define the key concepts of financial and generational sustainability. We then briefly 
discuss the relative merits of this approach. 
Features of FI and GI 
Studies of generational accounting generally assume either economic assumptions and models or 
use accrual accounting as a baseline to develop generational accounts. Klumpes (2000) examines 
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the generational accountability of the management of Australia’s largest public sector entity. 
Klumpes (2001) examines the financial accountability of Australia’s Medicare system. Klumpes 
(2003b) measures the obligations of six European governments to unfunded pay-as-you-go 
pension systems. Klumpes and McCrae and Tang (2005) examine the extent of pension under-
funding in the Australian public sector. Klumpes and Tang (2008) examine the cost incidence of 
the NHS in the UK using a generational accounting analysis. 
Table 1: Studies Applying Generational Accounting to the Financial Sustainability 
of Governments and Public Sector Enterprises 
 
Topic Authors Context Major findings 
Klumpes 
(2001) 
Analyzes the evolution of 
funding patterns of the 
State of New South 
Wales Superannuation 
scheme from 1995-2004. 
Scheme has evolved from public to 
private sector. The impact of 
political visibility on the 
generational accountability of the 
SASB is examined over time. 
Pension 
underfunding by 
State 
governments 
Klumpes, 
McCrae 
and Tang 
(2005) 
Project the burden of 
under-funded government 
employer pension 
obligations to three 
generational cohorts of 
public sector employees, 
based on a data set 
describing flow of 
funding characteristics of 
12 federal, state and local 
Australian government 
funds.  
The demographic trends imply a 
serious imbalance in equity across 
existing and future generations. 
Relative to accrual-based reporting 
practices, a statement of inter-
generational equity provides 
additional insights into the 
generational visibility of public 
pension funds. Underfunding 
practices concerning hidden public 
pension obligations across the EU 
vary considerably across 
governments 
Klumpes 
(2001) 
Analyze funding of 
Australian Medicare 
system 
Australian Medicare is significantly 
underfunded and is financed by 
future generations. 
Unfunded 
health care 
systems 
Klumpes 
and Tang 
(2008) 
Analyzes cost incidence 
of UK NHS system 
A combination of fiscal and 
generational imbalances largely 
explains the underfunding of the 
NHS. Data are taken from both 
historical trends in expenditure and 
ageing as well as projected 
demographics. The analysis implies 
that there is significant inter-
generational-inequity in the funding 
of NHS.UK NHS is significantly 
underfunded 
Unfunded social 
security systems 
Klumpes 
(2003a) 
Hidden obligations of EU 
states 
EU states have significant 
variations in the level and extent of 
underfunding 
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Klumpes 
(2003b) 
Determinants of social 
security underfunding in 
the OECD 
Variations in behavioral patterns 
across continental European and 
Anglo-American countries in the 
underfunding of public pensions 
Pension 
underfunding by 
government-
private 
enterprises 
Tang and 
Klumpes 
(2009) 
Nature of sharing of 
unfunded pension 
obligations by Chinese 
SOEs 
The simulation analysis identifies 
the dimensions of inter-generational 
transfer with important implications 
for financial reporting by SOEs to 
affected shareholders. A 
underfunding re-distribution rule is 
designed to investigate these 
implications. 
 
 
However, all of these studies rely on accrual-accounting as the baseline, whereas other studies 
(e.g. Gokhale and Smetters, 2003, 2006; Gokhale, 2008) use economic models. Thus there is an 
inconsistency in models across these studies. Gokhale and Smetters (2003) introduce the concept 
of ‘fiscal imbalance’, which adds to a government entity’s current accounting-based liabilities 
the present value of the difference between all projected non-interest spending and all projected 
revenue. Following their approach, any government or public sector entity insurance-related 
guarantee program may be considered to be financially sustainable if today’s publicly held debt 
plus the present value of projected non-interest spending and the present value of projected non-
interest spending is equal to the present value of projected government receipts. The spending 
and revenue projections are made under current policies. ‘Present values’ mean that amounts 
paid or received in relation to a government insurance guaranty program throughout the future 
are discounted at the long-term gilt yield in order to reflect their true value today. A financially 
sustainable policy can be sustained without changing either outlays or revenues. Hence a 
financially sustainable measure as of the end of year t is defined as (Gokhale and Smetter, 2003, 
8): 
 
FIt = PVEt – PVRt – At       (1) 
 
This definition is the excess of total expenditures over available resources in present value. PVEt 
is the present value of projected expenditures under current policies at the end of period t. PVRt 
is the present value of projected receipts under current policies, and At is assets in hand at the 
end of period t. 
 
For government insurance program funding policy to be financially sustainable, its FI must be 
zero. The government cannot spend and owe more than it will receive as revenue in present 
value. If the FI measured under current policies is positive, those policies are unsustainable and 
policymakers will have to change them at some future point in time. 
 
However the FI measure is not capable of providing the financial impact of all possible policy 
changes. This is because, any new policy that changes projected expenditures and revenues so 
that their increments are exactly equal in present value will provide offsetting increases in PVEt 
and/or PVRt, leaving FI unchanged. However, such FI-neutral policies could transfer net tax 
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burden from living to future generations. Thus a complementary measure is needed to show 
such redistributions of financial burdens. The FI measure exclusively reflects the sustainability 
of a given policy, but another measure is needed to indicate how FI is distributed across 
population subgroups. Another measure is needed to indicate how much of the FI arises from 
older generations shifting tax burdens to younger (including yet unborn) generations. Gokhale 
and Smetters (2003) define this as the ‘generational imbalance’ (‘GI’): 
 
GIt = PVELt – PVRLt – At                       (2) 
 
PVELt represents the present value of projected outlays that will be paid to current generations. 
PVRLt represents the present value of projected tax revenues from the same generations. At 
represents the insurance program’s current assets. Therefore GI captures that part of FI arising 
from all transactions with past and living generations throughout their lifetimes. The projected 
contribution to FI by future generations equals the difference between FI and GI.  
 
While the FI measure captures many large unfunded payment obligations not included in 
traditional accounting perspectives on government insurance programs, the GI measure captures 
the redistributive effect of alternative policies. Under a pay-as-you-go financed government 
insurance program funding policy, the GI measure increases even though FI does not change. 
This implies that the imbalance on account of future generations decreases. It also suggests that 
policymakers must achieve two objectives simultaneously; first, reduce the FI to zero. Second, 
choose a policy that delivers the best trade-off in costs imposed on different generations.  
The FI/GI Framework – A Way Forward? 
The above institutional review suggests that in recent years, public sector accounting has 
increasingly utilized the accounting techniques and practices of the private sector through the 
greater reliance on accruals-based principles. Thus it is not surprising that concepts such as 
‘cost’, ‘efficiency’, ‘economy’ and ‘effectiveness’ have entered into political discourse on the 
accountability of the public sector during this time. However a much neglected alternative line 
of economic reasoning argues instead that it is necessary to consider the impact of government 
policies across generations.  
 
The currently implemented accrual-accounting principles assume that the primary focus and 
objective of financial reporting concerns the stewardship or custody of existing resources of 
public enterprises. By contrast, the FI/GI framework implies that the efficient and equitable 
management of government public finances involve a broader objective of achieving inter-
generational altruism and therefore implies a form of ‘implicit social contracts or inter-
generational trusteeship’. The same argument applies to public sector organizations, which are 
typically under-funded relative to private organizations as governments who guarantee their 
services fail to pay all necessary contributions as they fall due. Specifically, obligations related 
to various benefits, such as pensions, are deferred until the entitlement must be paid. Current 
taxpayers, although benefiting from the services provided by contemporary public sector, are 
not paying the full cost of them, as the cost of the benefit payments being accrued are postponed 
to a time when existing contributors will have retired. The cost of these benefits will instead be 
borne by future taxpayers, who will not have benefited from services provided by today’s public 
sector workforce. Of course this would not matter if the composition of the population was 
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unchanging. The problem arises because, in all industrialized countries a combination of falling 
birth rates and increasing longevity means that progressively fewer workers will be supporting 
each public sector retiree. The result is that future generations of taxpayers will be forced to bear 
the growing burden of funding the retirement benefits of previous generations of beneficiaries.  
 
Relative to accrual-based accounting principles, we consider that the FI/GI framework 
perspective serves a broader objective in reporting on inter-generational equity. It also addresses 
Copley et al.’s (1997) concerns about the decision usefulness to the citizenry of the application 
of accrual-based accounting to the public sector, by providing information relevant to a broader 
users’ constituency of both current and future generations of taxpayers. Finally, we believe that 
a FI/GI framework is applicable to government insurance programs by recognizing explicitly 
those items that are required to bring an entity into generational balance. The FI/GI framework 
indicates the zero-sum nature of insurance related guarantee programs policy in the public 
sector, when viewed from an inter-generational perspective. Table 2 summarizes the major 
conceptual differences between accrual-based accounting and the FI/GI framework. An intuitive 
explanation is provided, below. 
 
Table 2: Major Conceptual Differences Between Generational and Accrual-based 
Perspectives in Government Financial Reporting 
Conceptual 
Framework  
Accrual-based Perspective Generational-based Perspective 
Objective Report on inter-period equity 
(GASB, p. 22) 
Provide information about inter-
generational equity (AAS 31, p. 10) 
Intended Users Present and potential taxpayers Current and future generations of 
taxpayers 
Recognition 
Criteria 
For each entity, revenues when 
earned and expenses when 
related good or service used 
For each generation, net payments and 
receipts over lifetime 
Benefits and Costs of Generational Accounts 
In this section, we consider the relative benefits and costs of implementing generational 
accounts to an accrual system of accounts for acquitting inter-generational equity. From a 
conceptual perspective, Gokhale and Smetters (2003) argue that any government accounts 
concerning policies or commitments that involve inter-generational contracts should possess a 
number of desirable characteristics. The first is that they are forward-looking. Adopting new 
forward-looking performance measures would reveal a very different and more accurate picture 
of the government program’s financial status, as well as the size and nature of the needed policy 
adjustments. 
 
A second desirable feature of a proper measure is that it should include all future years, i.e. 
calculated in perpetuity. By contrast, accrual-based accounting estimates do not completely 
account for the financial imbalances because of the arbitrary truncation of the projection 
horizon. If deficits beyond the forecast horizon are large and growing, then annuity-based 
estimates will severely understate the full magnitude of the financial sustainability of such 
programmes.  
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Gokhale and Smetters (2003, 19) argue that a third desirable feature of a financial measure is 
that it be complete – i.e. it should encompass the entire operations of the entity. Since most 
government entities operate to provide society with some form of either implicit or explicit 
insurance against risk, it is not at all clear that accrual-based accounting principles capture these 
contingencies given the standard accounting convention that any measured event can only arise 
from past transactions. 
 
A fourth desirable property is that that the measure should be based on current policy. For a 
proposed measure to be useful, it must characterize current policy. By contrast, accrual 
accounting adopts a ‘shutdown’ liability measure because it effectively assumes that the entity 
will not be in existence in future years, and therefore does not include future expected 
expenditures. By contrast, it is reasonable to assume that governments have the power to amend 
policies, e.g. taxes, expenditure. 
 
A fifth criteria argued by Gokhale and Smetters (2003) is that the measure should correctly 
reflect the impact of all policy changes. This includes the fact that the measure should not 
change when policy changes are actuarially neutral for all generations. It must also accurately 
reflect all actuarially non-neutral policies. By contrast, a standard assumption underlying the 
accrual system of accounting means that revenues and expenses are recognised only at the time 
that the sales are made and the "input" used, etc., and not when the monetary consequences of 
such actions occur.  
 
Finally, the sixth desirable feature argued by Gokhale and Smetters (2003, 20) is that the 
measure should be conceptually straightforward and possess properties that are easy to 
communicate. Under accrual accounting, the definition of an event is defined primarily by the 
time period in which a transaction occurs, e.g. the correct measurement of the effect of a sale 
requires that both the revenue (sale) and its associated expense (Cost of Goods Sold, COGS) 
should be recognised simultaneously (i.e. matched). By contrast, the generational accounting 
measure allows for a separation between the time when an item is recognised and the time when 
the service is acquitted. For example, health care, pensions and social security obligations arise 
whenever a citizen becomes entitled to that service, and grows over time at the rate of interest. 
Hence a change in the measure from one year to the next can be broken down into the amounts 
due to accumulated interest, policy changes, differences in economic outcomes relative to 
projections, and updates to economic assumptions used in making budget projections. The 
generational accounting measure is also simple because it equals the amount of fiscal imbalance 
that is due to current and past generations. However, other complementary measures could also 
be used, including ones that describe imbalances by narrowly defined birth cohorts, gender, rates 
and so on.  
 
On the other hand, Gokhale (2009) identifies a number of criticisms of generational accounts. 
First, it measures the net costs of taxes and transfers but excludes the indirect benefits derived 
from government public goods and service purchase. If the benefits from government 
transactions accrue much later, then the average generational account facing future generations 
may not accurately reflect their treatment under current policies. Similar criticisms can be 
leveled at accrual accounting. In fact, the conservatism principle is intended to safeguard against 
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the natural tendency for ‘over optimism’ in presenting profit. We must recognise revenues only 
when they are certain (i.e. actual sales, not advance orders or advance receipts).  On the other 
hand, we should be careful not to understate expenses (which would also cause profits to be too 
high). However from a government perspective, such principles may end up hindering rather 
than enhancing accountability, where the affected resources have implications for future use 
beyond the current horizon. 
 
A second major criticism of generational accounting is that it does not factor in the costs and 
benefits from government insurance provision. However, Gokhale also cites other dynamic 
simulation studies which imply that generational accounts correspond reasonably well to welfare 
gains and losses arising from policy changes. By contrast, government guarantees have only 
very recently been subject to any attention by accrual-based accounting standards, and in any 
case are mostly generally regarded as ‘contingent events’, and therefore not certain in amount to 
be recognised on the balance sheet. 
 
Gokhale (2009) notes a third major criticism of generational accounting, that it ignores economic 
responses when estimating policy adjustments for restoring generational balance. On the other 
hand, Gokhale (2009) also acknowledges that its ‘static’ estimates probably constitute a ‘lower 
bound of required adjustments’. By contrast, accrual-based accounts only account for efforts that 
are ‘realised’. For instance, consistent with private sector accounting practices, when a 
government entity makes a sale on credit, it cannot be sure that the cash value will ever be 
realised.  So it is normal to set off a provision for bad debts against the debtors to reduce the net 
value of the asset, by allowing for a degree of non-payment by customers. Yet similar 
considerations cannot be applied to ‘future events’ e.g. ‘provisions’ cannot be made for future 
events. 
 
A fourth limitation of generational accounts is that it employs a hypothetical policy for future 
generations. By contrast, current budgetary constraints mean that many government and public 
sector enterprises wish to measure the effects of keeping their policies unchanged. Gokhale and 
Smetters (2003) solve this issue and develop alternative fiscal and generational imbalance 
measures that do not involve hypothetical policies.  
 
A fifth limitation of generational accounting is that it discounts future flows using a common 
discount rate whereas taxes and transfers may well be subject to different degrees of policy 
and/or economic uncertainties. Related, it may be appropriate to use different discount rates for 
different cohorts because they face different risks. To the extent that the discount rate is of 
concern, Gokhale (2009) notes that generational accounting studies often include sensitivity 
analysis under alternative assumptions, including alternative discount rates. By contrast, accrual-
based accounts are only based on a specific set of actuarial assumptions; and it is generally left to 
the reader to interpolate how a change in assumption or policy might affect the reported 
numbers.   
Summary, Conclusions, and Policy Implications 
We propose a FI/GI framework approach developed by Gokhale and Smetters (2003) to provide 
a basis for sustainable financial management of the public sector insurance-related guarantee 
programs. The framework is shown to be more consistent with a life cycle perspective on public 
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sector investing and finance principles. We argue that the FI/GI approach is more applicable 
than existing accrual-based accounting systems to better understanding government funding 
policies and guarantee programs. In addition to enhancing transparency and accountability, it 
also provides a number of unique insights into the financial dimensions and accountability 
implications of insurance guarantee programs. We believe that disclosing this type of present-
value based information can significantly extend the nature and scope of financial accountability 
of under-funded public sector funds to a broad set of stakeholders and thereby provide a useful 
supplement to current-value financial statements based on accrual-accounting principles. Such a 
framework is potentially applicable to a broader range of public sector entities whose liabilities 
and/or capital funding is subject to the effects of demographic transition (e.g. pay-as-you-go 
funded social security and health care schemes).  
 
At a conceptual level, the framework that we propose questions the appropriateness of current, 
standard conventions of public sector accounting and accountability that are framed by reference 
to accrual-based accounting principles (e.g. Funnell and Cooper, 1999). Accordingly, we fully 
expect that the FI/GI framework will attract controversy and criticism from the broader 
professional and academic accounting and management communities for a number of reasons.   
 
First, whereas accrual-based accounting principles imply a current or market-value basis of 
measuring a public sector entity’s existing assets obligations, generational accounting 
methodology implies instead a measurement system that is based entirely on ex ante 
information. This is because generational accounting is based on the annual estimates of lifetime 
cash contributions of each cohort to an entity, less the estimates of lifetime benefits receivable 
by them, all suitably discounted to their present values. Consequently, the calculations are not 
based on verifiable value but are based on far-reaching assumptions of life expectancy, incomes, 
economic growth, inflation and productivity. While many view market values as a de rigueur 
component of both the theory and practice of accounting measurement, present values are still 
viewed by many academics and professionals as being the province of actuarial science and 
economics. 
 
A more fundamental criticism of generational accounting from a traditional accounting 
viewpoint concerns the fact that values of public fund net worth derived under each system have 
significantly different decision-making implications. A zero net value for a pension fund under 
accrual-based accounting principles implies that a public fund is just meeting its obligations. 
Thus, accrual-based accounting principles provide a basis for determining the fund’s overall net 
worth in terms of its aggregated assets and liabilities based on past funding policies. By contrast, 
a zero net present value of net contributions indicates that each generational cohort is just paying 
its way. Generational accounting models thus provide a basis for judging whether the 
continuation of current policies involves a prospective inter-generational redistribution of 
pension fund net worth. This emphasis on the stakeholder implications of the under-funding of 
public sector obligations contrasts with standard notions of public sector under-funding 
practices. For instance, the GASB standard identifies efficiency and effectiveness in the use of 
existing resources as the primary objective of financial reporting, rather than asking whether 
their mode of financing is equitable to participants and other stakeholders (Marks et. al., 1988).  
 
These criticisms bear upon the wider academic debate as to whether equivalent accounting 
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principles should apply to both the private and public sector (e.g. Barton, 1999a). Indeed the 
public sector increasingly is utilizing the accounting of the private sector. Thus cost, efficiency, 
economy and effectiveness have entered into political discourse. By contrast, generational 
accounting implies that a different form of accountability applies to the public sector, at least for 
certain types of entity whose resources involve the allocation of risk among various generational 
cohorts of participants. 
 
There are at least three major policy implications. First, the FI/GI framework implies a serious 
imbalance in equity which reflects the combination of the explicit liability to service very large 
amounts of public spending and the implicit liability to pay substantial sums to existing and 
future generations of public welfare beneficiaries. Second, our analysis raises serious questions 
over the differential ability of levels of governments to maintain inter-generational equity in 
their under-funded public sector services. Third, the FI/GI framework can apply to other 
demographic and inter-generational equity sensitive public policy settings, such as environment, 
long-term health care and the valuation of infrastructure. They can also be applied to other 
private sector entities with inter-generational long-term insurance related obligations, such as 
unfunded pension funds and health care obligations. 
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